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s atmospheric CO 2 remains in the range of 400 ppm, it is
necessary to find new international coordination to deal
with climate change. The best way forward is an interna-
tional regime of harmonized domestic carbon taxes. By agreeing
to a minimum amount of taxation on domestic, point-source pro-
ducers, money can be set aside for adaptation costs and alternative
means of energy production. Finally, such a plan will overcome
the problem of non-participation of countries in agreements like
the Kyoto Protocol. As this is a treaty dealing with economics and
trade, countries can place taxes on imports of non-participatory
countries under exceptions of GATT Article XX.
1. INTRODUCTION: IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE
At the time of its creation, the Kyoto Protocol1 was con-
sidered by many to be the strongest international agreement on
the subject of climate change. 2 In 1997, 182 nations committed
to minimizing greenhouse gases (GHGs) during the period of
2005-2008, with the goal of reducing GHGs to below 1990s lev-
els.3 Early critics of the Kyoto Protocol pointed out future flaws:
simply put, the underlying approach was bound to fail because
it was premised on setting national emissions targets rather than
dealing with the actual problem of global warming caused by
emissions.4 Despite noble ambitions, emissions have grown sig-
nificantly.5 By most accounts the Kyoto Protocol has "unequivo-
cally failed.' 6 The fault lies in several areas. First, it was a regime
which created "common but differentiated responsibilities" 7 put-
ting little to no responsibility on developing nations to consider
emission reductions.8 While some combination of domestic
efforts and a global recession has created a decline in emissions
in the developed world, unchecked growth of emissions in the
developing world is beginning to overcome that of the developed
world, calling into question the apparent malarkey on common
but differentiated responsibilities. For example, while the United
States (US) remains a much larger per capita producer of Carbon
Dioxide (C0 2) than other major world economies, China and
India are both increasing their respective CO2 output at a whop-
ping seven percent annually, while the US is either steady or
declining.9 The per capita CO2 output for both China and India
is also rapidly increasing at similar rates (seven percent and six
percent for China and India respectively).1" Assuming steady
population growth rates, 11 China and India will both surpass the
US per capita production of CO 2 within two decades. 12 Second,
in addition to lack of buy-in by major nations such as the US in
the initial stages of the Kyoto Protocol, some nations have lost
faith. (Consider Canada which declared that the Protocol "does
not represent a way forward," 13 despite its own plummeting
emissions, and Russia which has declined to take on additional
obligations despite its own drops in emissions). 14 Finally, the
Kyoto Protocol failed to deal with many emissions such as those
of airlines and shipping companies. 5 Transport alone accounts
for at least fourteen percent of global GHG emissions. 16
This Article serves to show a way forward from a failed
Kyoto Protocol to create an international taxation scheme that
harmonizes taxes levied upon producers of CO 2 by their respec-
tive nation states.
While this Article acknowledges that global warming is part
of a natural cycle, it is an undeniable fact that the total amount
of atmospheric CO 2 is at all-time highs for recorded history. 17
A consideration of ice core samples from Antarctica gives rev-
elation of GHGs going back some 800,000 years and reveals
periods of global cooling when the parts per million (PPM) was
as low as 175 and periods of global warming with nearly 300
ppm. 8 Since modern atmospheric measurements began in 1958,
the number has steadily increased from 315 PPM to a close to
400 PPM.1 9 Such a level is unprecedented, at least within the
timeframe of human history going back at least 800 millennia.20
While there is no empirical evidence indicating what awaits
us with such a high level of CO2 in the atmosphere, the warmest
weather in recorded history has already occurred in the last gen-
eration.21 With CO 2 levels to exceeding 400 PPM, one should
consider treading carefully in unfamiliar territory. Certainly as
part of a natural cycle the planet may heal itself, but "if humanity
wishes to preserve a planet similar to that on which civilization
developed and to which life on earth is adapted, paleoclimate
evidence and ongoing climate change suggest that CO 2 will need
to be reduced to at least 350 PPM"' 22 lest we go to the "point of
no return."
23
Though the ramifications of dealing with CO 2 are expen-
sive and inconvenient, the costs, both monetary and socio-
logical, are far greater in the near future than in the present.
Simply put, "delaying action is a false economy."24 Cost of
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environmental degradation already has a negative effect on the
economy; for example, economic losses due to environmental
degradation and pollution cost roughly 10 percent of China's
gross national income. 25
It is with some irony that a need for international coordina-
tion on environmental issues comes as a necessary byproduct of
international coordination in trade liberalization. The road to trade
liberalization has been disrupted throughout modern history by
war and regional animosity, in a continual push towards opening
of borders and removing of protectionist policies. 26 In recent years
the developed world is rallying around a second issue of GHGs. 27
Given the relationship to expanding global trade and increased
greenhouse gases, one might argue that the latter is the logical
outgrowth of the former; if not for the advancement of trade
through economic coordination, greenhouse gases might largely
be a moot point. If we chart global GDP growth alongside the
growth of greenhouse gas productions, there would be a surpris-
ing similarity.2 8 The question arises: can one harness the power of
economic coordination and integration to effect processes neces-
sary to diminish the production of GHGs while repairing current
and future damage caused by climate change? When viewing
the problems tackled by our predecessors, one can be optimistic.
Certainly global measures
to reduce the depletion of
the ozone layer caused by "Such a level
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
have been successful, but at least within
CFCs were only a small por-
tion of the overall economy.29  human history
Dealing with GHGs would
have an effect on nearly every 800 mn
aspect in the daily life of the
average industrialized citizen.
Sometimes it is necessary to state the obvious: environmen-
tal degradation knows no political boundaries. Smog regularly
drifts westward from China to choke neighboring countries
of South Korea and Japan.3" The same can be said for that of
India's neighbor, Bangladesh.3 1 Meanwhile, some 37,000 tons
of plastic particles have accumulated in ocean eddies throughout
the world.3 2 Increasing desertification throughout the world has
been a destabilizing effect on numerous countries with conflicts
regularly spilling over borders to threaten the lives of the indig-
enous population as well as the resource chain for the developed
world. 33 The world is awash with well-intended, but often futile,
efforts to deal with environmental degradation (each year, more
than 30 additional Multilateral Environmental Agreements are
signed with the intent to solve global environmental problems). 34
Most are dominated by language of second and third generation
rights, and one wonders if these merely amount to a "collection
of pious phrases."35 While second and third generation rights are
noble concepts, in a legal sense, the Lorax3 6 has no standing.37
This is not to discount all international regimes dealing with
the environment. However, the most successful seem to deal
first with economic concerns and only later, with environmen-





Organization which began merely as a United Nations body to
establish international norms for shipping and only later became
the designated shepherd of the maritime environment.38 This
pragmatic body along with its derivative, the International Oil
Pollution Compensation (IOPC). 39 Funds have led to the cre-
ation of a fund for victims of oil pollution caused by oil tanker
accidents.4" Ultimately the polluter pay scheme does not slow
the flow of oil but is the impetus for greater caution lest the com-
panies pay up for their mess.
4 1
Moving forward on the host of environmental problems
means taking this more pragmatic approach: damage will occur,
but we have the ability to counteract this damage, correct the
damage, and encourage industries to adapt to a more sustainable
method of operation. While the Arch Druids42 would have us
conserve what is left and shut down industry entirely, this mono-
lithic approach is realistic neither in a domestic effort, nor in an
international effort. Actions by any individual country result in a
zero-sum game;43 for example, a sudden shift in fuel efficiency
in the United States would create a glut on the world market
causing lower fuel costs. 44 There is little doubt that impoverished
countries would "snap up the suddenly plentiful, suddenly cheap
crude oil and use it to develop their own economies. 45
This Article will briefly
discuss the economic reali-
d, ties of why the carbon tax is
the best solution to deal with
e timeframe of climate change. It will then
provide examples of success-
ng back at least ful national and regional car-
• ia ,"bon taxes. Third, it will posit
nnia." an international carbon tax
regime and the application of
the regime.
2. WHY CARBON TAX?
It is generally understood by all economists that in order to
reduce the potential of further impacts of climate change on the
world, it will be necessary to tax all parts of the production and
use of fossil fuels.46 A carbon tax can be an example of applying
the "double dividend hypothesis" which means that the taxation
scheme encourages both more efficient uses of existing resources
as well as reducing the negative result of such uses.47 A tax is a
cost-efficient method of lowering fossil fuel consumption by
making them more expensive and encouraging use of alterna-
tive technologies, 48 and giving more flexibility to internalize the
costs of emissions.4 9 Carbon taxes could affect any industry with
the capacity to pollute.50 However, the burden will likely fall
upon the energy and transportation sectors.s 1 Additionally, once
a tax is levied on energy and transportation sectors, there may
be room to apply it to other industries as needed. For example,
a tax on plastic producers could create an incentive to produce
more durable plastics or induce them to lobby local governments
to increase the recyclability of their products. Even in the cases
where alternative methods of Command-and-Control Regulation,
Cap-and-Trade, and Government Subsidies have worked, they can
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still work concurrently with a Carbon Tax model. The advantages
and disadvantages of each are discussed below.
A. COMMAND-AND-CONTROL REGULATION
Though Command-and-Control was once the preferred singu-
lar method of dealing with emissions, it is best when the substance
intended on being regulated is so toxic and destructive that there is
little economic advantage to balance the negative ramifications of
its use.52 An example of this is the phasing out of CFCs when the
use of them was demonstrated as a causative relationship to the
thinning of the ozone layer.53 With CFCs, there was a host of alter-
native chemicals to replace the CFCs, which did not damage the
ozone including hydrochlorofluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons,
and hydrocarbons.54 However, the use of command and control
regulations means large government agencies and complicated
litigation when things went awry.55 Such a draconian approach
requires that the chemicals be of the most dangerous type in order
to apply a regulation that can effectively destroy a market rather
than tailoring it to reach greater efficiency.
There are other success stories for schemes that reward
"good" behavior and punish "bad" behavior. Consider the exam-
ple of Germany taxing leaded gas at a much higher rate than
unleaded gas. 56 In a manner
of a decade, such incentives
virtually eliminated leaded
gas in Germany.57 Similar 'A Cap-and
to the successes with leaded
gasoline are the CAFE 58  creates a gove
standards in the US, which
have significantly increased maximum an
auto efficiency since their emissionsf fr
first use during the oil crisis
of the 1970s. 59 Despite the
initial burdens placed upon
the industry, the auto industries have survived in both countries.
However, it is important to remember that more efficient autos
do not necessarily mean more efficient drivers. An auto with 50
percent better fuel economy can save gas, but a driver who drives
50 percent more with the savings uses the same amount of gas.
60
B. CAP-AND TRADE
A Cap-and-Trade program creates a government-informed
maximum amount of carbon emissions from a given party.61
Allowances in the form of metric tons are allotted and compa-
nies which fall below their respective caps are able to sell their
leftover allowances to other companies.62 On the other hand,
Cap-and-Trade takes much of the power from government and
into the hands of private enterprise, encouraging them to become
more efficient in order to sell their allotments for a profit.63
However, Cap-and-Trade is complicated, and depending on the
regime, does little to actually reduce net carbon; it merely insures
more efficiency of production. 64 That efficiency is responsible
for some economic growth due to better allocation of resources,
but not to the extent of that wrought from a Carbon Tax. The
advantage of the Cap-and-Trade system seems to be the political




insist they are not raising taxes , when avoiding the use of the
word tax means that legislation may more likely to survive the
political process.65 An important issue to consider is that Cap-
and-Trade can slow the growth of emissions but may not actually
cut emissions.
66
In addition to the failure to actually cut emissions is the
impossibility of government to always stay ahead of economic
trends which can create very inefficient allocation of allotments
without a clear knowledge of a proper balance. 67 An example
of this is the European Union's Environmental Trading System
(EU-ETS). 68 This was the most robust carbon-trading system in
the world, but often viewed as a failure in retrospect. The worst
aspect is that the inability to adapt allotments during the eco-
nomic recession meant a glut of allotments for trade, and as with
all supply-demand balances, the price of carbon crashed. 69 The
fact that the European Parliament declined to bolster it in 2013
is perhaps the best indicator of its failings.70 Other experiments
in Cap-and-Trade have also had similar difficult learning curves
including in the US where carbon markets often "experience
volatile, often unforeseen, price shifts."7 1 From 2005 to 2011,
EU-ETS cost Europe some $287 billion and had "almost zero
impact" on the overall emissions. 72 The proverb of putting good
money after bad comes to
mind when considering calls
that we have not given carbon
ade program trading enough time.
nent-informed C. GOVERNMENT
nt of carbon SUBSIDIESGovernment subsidies
given party." continually pose the problem
of government participation
- in the market. Governments
often lack the flexibility to
recognize what consumers will use or emerging technologies that
supersede that which the government wishes to sponsor through
subsidies. Even the most developed nations may be guilty of the
proverbial "surplus of left shoes."7 3 An example of this in recent
history is Solyndra which defaulted on a $535 million loan for the
development of solar technology guaranteed by the Department of
Energy amid accusations of fraud by many political opponents of
the Obama Administration.74 It is dishonest to say that all products
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act75 under which
Solyndra was subsidized were a failure-far from it.76 In fact the
majority of investments in green technology by the US govern-
ment in the American Recovery and Investment Act seem to have
been a success. 77 However, the rapid increase of investment in
renewable energy around the same time seems to indicate that the
free market had beaten Congress and the Obama Administration to
the punch. For example a 2008 study78 showed that wind capacity
increased by 51 percent and solar photovoltaic capacity increased
by 44 percent from 2007.79 Moreover private sector investments
had exceeded $23 billion in 2008.80 Arguably, the $32 billion allo-
cated to clean energy projects in 2009 was quite late to the party.81
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In addition to the private sector outpacing the government,
there is a real concern of creating an "iron triangle."8 2 The
example which bests demonstrates the Iron Triangle from the
perspective of the US is the military industrial-complex which
is regularly accused of producing large quantities of outdated
technology 83 or producing technology so far beyond the capa-
bilities of our opponents that it defies reason.8 4 It is a reasonable
extrapolation that alternative energy industries would create just
as much of a boondoggle as past cooperation between govern-
ment and an industry. That a recent Oklahoma bill penalizes
homeowners for installing solar panels while simultaneously
subsidizing traditional power plants is indicative of how slowly
the government can react once subsidies for a given industry are
in place. 85
Of course, not all subsidies are as problematic as the exam-
ples above, but a subsidy does not come from out of thin air, it is
a result of diverting tax dollars from somewhere else. In revenue
producing carbon taxes discussed later in this Article at least
some of the money can be diverted into subsidies. While not
meant to completely demolish the function of subsidies, at the
very least this section suggests that subsidies should be a light
touch that does not create industry dependency and involves a
sound reallocation of taxes on other industries.
3. EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL CARBON TAX REGIMES
AT THE NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL LEVEL
An economic theory is best illustrated by practical suc-
cesses. While individual successes may be questioned or even
dismissed on evidence of other causes, success is a possibility
for taxation at a local or national level. Worldwide, at least 15
countries have some sort of carbon tax regime, but many pro-
vide such broad exemptions for various sectors or households
that one wonders if they serve any purpose.8 6 In North America,
three Canadian provinces have experimented with carbon taxa-
tion.8 7 Australia instituted a carbon tax over a two-year period
from 2012 to 2014.8 In Europe, Ireland has had tentative suc-
cess on its carbon tax introduced in in 2010.89 An analysis of
these programs is included below.
A. CANADIAN PROVINCES
British Columbia, Quebec, and Alberta have attempted
taxation schemes to reduce GHG. In October 2007, Quebec
introduced the first North American carbon tax by introducing a
duty of $3 per ton of CO 2 on bulk sales of fossil fuels.90 Alberta
taxed large industrial emitters (greater than 100,000 tons) at a
rate of $15 per ton of CO 2. 91 British Columbia followed a few
months later to introduce a consumption-based tax designed to
reduce GHG emissions in February 2008.92 British Columbia's
rates were set up to result in $10 per ton of CO2 emissions, but
were levied at the consumer level. 93
The above reductions must also be taken into consideration
alongside the fact that Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol in
December of 2002 to reduce Canadian GHG emissions by six per-
cent from the 1990 level of 599 million tons of CO 2 emissions. 94
Despite such an endeavor, Canadian GHG continued to increase
to more than thirty four percent of Canada's commitment under
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the Kyoto Protocol. 95 This was in no small part due to the failure
to introduce substantive policy changes beyond increased "public
education, voluntary initiatives, and fiscal incentives." 96 Such
"pious hopes and good intentions" 97 were sought by the Liberal
Party in control of the Canadian government, but the Conservative
Party under direction of Stephen Harper fared no better and the
Canadian government reneged on the commitments in its ascen-
sion to the Kyoto Protocol.98 It is with such a political background
that prompted the above attempts by British Columbia and Quebec
to deal with global warming.
A retrospective look indicates a success for British
Columbia. In British Columbia, "[t]he carbon tax has been
good for the environment, good for taxpayers and it has not hurt
the economy."99 Such a pronouncement is backed by a drop in
per capita fuel consumption by 4.5 percent and unemployment
remaining below the national average. 100 Use of all fuels covered
by the tax is down by sixteen percent in six years while Canada's
Kyoto target was a six percent reduction over twenty years. 101
Additionally, the shift in GHG production seems to be in defi-
ance of presumed economic trends and carbon leakage. While
Canada entered an economic downturn in 2007 and continuing
until the present, 10 2 fuel use in other provinces continued to rise
by three percent annually from 2008-2013.1l 3 Likewise, cross
border fuel purchases are said to account for only 1-2 percent of
British Columbia's sixteen percent reduction in fuel use. 104 On
the other hand Alberta and Quebec have had less success, though
at the time of this writing, little conclusive research indicates a
reason why. The devil is in the details. 10 5
B. AUSTRALIA
Australia's flirtation with carbon tax was brief, lasting only
two years as the "political stepchild" of political wrangling to
achieve a coalition government in 2011-2012.106 While GHG
gas emissions had been falling for years, the drop from 2012
to 2013 was the largest in 24 years with total emissions fall-
ing by 0.8 percent reported in the Sydney Morning Herald,
a right of center daily newspaper. 10 7 The national electricity
market experienced the most marked change in total emissions.
Emissions fell by between 5 and 8 million tons from 2012 to
2013 and between 6 and 9 million tons from 2013 to 2014.108
After the repeal of the carbon tax in 2014, emissions have
fallen back to their previous levels. 10 9 It is unclear if the sud-
den rise is directly attributable to the repeal of the carbon tax
as "the government was 'ripping away' at other policies curb-
ing emissions, with plans to scrap the Australian Renewable
Energy Agency, the Clean Energy Finance Corp, and energy
efficiency programs." 110 As with Alberta and Quebec, the lack
of conclusive peer-reviewed data makes it difficult to make
firm conclusions, but the economic data may be helpful.111
C. IRELAND
Ireland instituted its carbon tax regime in 2010 and has
been "quite successful" '112 when considering economic data and
overall emissions.113 The Irish method involved taxation directly
on the consumer in a draconian method that included even the
weighing of non-recycled residential garbage for taxation. 114
The tax was implemented in the wake of the global financial cri-
sis and ahead of the Kyoto Protocol deadline of 2012.115 Bearing
in mind that emissions other than electricity production had been
slowly falling for some time since the late 1990s, emissions fell
dramatically in the period immediately after the tax by 22.4 per-
cent between 2010 and 2012.116 Total emissions declined again
in the by an additional 0.7 percent from 2012 to 2013.117
4. BuT WHY AN INTERNATIONAL CARBON
TAX REGIME?
The idea of an international carbon tax in scholarly circles
is not new, but it is generally mentioned merely as a footnote
in broader discussions of international environmental issues.
The Honorable Richard L. Ottinger posited an international
carbon tax in 1991, stating affirmatively that "[i]t is time to
institute one." ' However, he provided no framework for such
implementation and merely acknowledged the problems associ-
ated with carbon leakage and the fledgling attempts at carbon
taxes in Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, Germany, Norway,
and Switzerland. 119 Analysis remained tangential and fettered
throughout the next two decades with one author suggesting that
there should be a harmonization at a domestic level with all par-
ticipating countries setting a standard tax rate. 2 ' The final word
on analysis of an international carbon tax in the 1990s was that
the Kyoto Protocol was the only viable option."' The following
decade was not much of an improvement with one article posit-
ing that it was impossible to know precisely how much emis-
sion reduction could be achieved by a tax system; developed
countries were already tax averse, and developing countries
would need assistance. 122 Such concerns were reiterated shortly
thereafter. 123 Other works have posited the benefit of an interna-
tional carbon tax in their ability to incorporate existing domestic
carbon taxation schemes as harmonization is reached. 124
In considering successful carbon taxation schemes, a ques-
tion arises on why an international solution is needed if domestic
remedies have been successful; in short, domestic remedies are
not sufficient. One of the problems of Kyoto was that it was
not truly collective action but a commitment to set national
targets that did not really address the collective problem. 125 As
with any Tragedy of the Commons collective problems require
collective action through some centrally administered body.126
Dealing with a collective issue of GHGs, this Article argues that
a carbon tax applied in a harmonized fashion at national level
will accomplish such a goal. First, from a practical standpoint,
carbon leakage is a key concern on any domestic regime. While
earlier analysis demonstrates that economies may continue to
prosper with emissions constrained by taxes, it does not entirely
refute the argument that taxation will induce industries to merely
move across borders to avoid taxes and cause no net change in
worldwide emissions. 127 Second, many domestic regimes are not
in a position to deal with adaptation costs.1 28 As detailed below,
international coordination to disperse revenue to the most vul-
nerable through a harmonized taxation scheme may be the best
method to solve the above problems.
An international carbon tax envisioned in this Article will
be: 1) harmonized and created by a new treaty body 2) col-
lected by domestic governments 3) enforced by tariffs on non-
participatory countries in compliance with Article XX of the
GATT 4) a portion of funds collected domestically to be paid
to an international agency for the purposes of funding adapta-
tion costs. Such a domestic carbon tax harmonized across all
countries offers a cost-effective means of obtaining CO 2 reduc-
tions. 129 Additional taxes upon existing national frameworks will
differ from country to country to account for existing taxes and
other constraints. 130 Furthermore, rather than an arbitrary alloca-
tion of quotas with discord between developed and developing
countries, a carbon tax will be a mutually agreed upon action
for all.i' Finally, though there are other GHGs responsible for
climate change, CO 2 is the most ubiquitous and under current
production, the most harmful. Other GHGs can be dealt with as
the CO 2 regime becomes entrenched and successful.
A. HARMONIZATION
We must begin to look at the producers of pollutions as the
giant Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), which eclipse the eco-
nomic power of many nations. While some would argue that the
nation states should be responsible for the pollutions of its eco-
nomic citizens, this is short sighted for three reasons. First, the
proliferation of MNEs means great difficulty in establishing the
nexus of a business' operation. Secondly, if we consider gross
profits as analogous to a country's GDP, the profits of the largest
multi-national companies have allowed them to eclipse many
gross domestic products of individual nations. 13 2 Most devel-
oped nations have instituted eco taxes at some level of another.
Such an international scheme is not unprecedented, as some
have proposed a sort of UN Global Transaction Tax. 13 3 A criticism
is that allowing the money to pass through the hands of individual
governments creates suspicion that the money is not going directly
to the appropriate areas.134 Though some might suggest that states
could merely earmark based on appropriate demands,135 this relies
on the political whims of the nation states involved. Lasting posi-
tive change will come in the form of some sort of international
accord, protocol, or treaty.1 36 Such an explanation of how a treaty
regime can work is described later in the section on how to collect
and allocate an internationally pooled fund.
B. A TAX UPON WHOM?
Moving forward will mean not repeating the same mistakes
of the Kyoto Protocol. Taxing only industrialized countries gives
those countries an incentive to not participate with political talk-
ing points to justify that lack of participation. 137 While the Kyoto
Protocol seemed to ignore the rising emissions of the developing
countries, all countries should levy a comprehensive tax scheme
on point-source producers of GHGs. This will serve to avoid
the problems of Kyoto with countries like the United States not
participating at all or countries like Canada pulling out when it
is politically expedient. Targeting point-source producers rather
than consumers is necessary because the consumer lacks the
economy of scale to make -large-scale adjustments to a sudden
increase in price while a point-source producer can spread initial
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costs among myriad consumers while simultaneously working
to increase efficiency to maintain profitability in the long run.
Because countries generally report to the IMF on their mac-
roeconomic policies, GDP, and other information, it is easy to
establish a baseline on existing revenues and profits of the major
industries subject to a harmonized tax regime.138 Finally, it is
folly to say that companies and nations would revolt at such a
large-scale tax scheme. Within the confines of the European
Union (EU) nations have been willing to assent to a broader
scheme.139 Likewise, businesses in the US and the EU have been
willing to comport to attempts at carbon trading; therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that other measures can be met with the
same grudging acceptance.
C. METHOD OF ENFORCEMENT
One of the biggest problems in the Kyoto Protocol was the
disheartening lack of participation by countries like the US in
the final negotiations and ratification process. 140 Any taxation
scheme will require buy-in from all the major and develop-
ing nations. But without coercive measures, what can be done
about free riders among
developed nations, which
have persistent resentment
of taxation, regardless of the "One of the b
source or justification? 141
Border adjustments 142 may ifl Kyoto I
serve to force harmoniza- disheartening la
tion on imports from nations
who refuse to participate in by countrie6
an international carbon tax
regime and can provide the the final n
method by which participa-
tory nations can coerce the ratfcati
outliers into compliance. 143
Such border adjustments
work in two ways to ensure compliance. First, they protect one
nation from a lack of competitiveness for domestic producers
at the hands of foreign producers not subject to a similar tax
scheme. 144 Secondly, they reduce the incentive of free riders to
not apply taxes domestically, because taxes levied on exports at
their destination will mean no direct benefit to the companies
who avoid domestic tax burdens. Moreover, not only are such
measures likely in compliance with the GATT, but also have
actually been recommended in the past as a way to salvage the
Kyoto Protocol. 145
GATT Article XX is an avenue to justify preferential mea-
sures that would otherwise violate GATT provisions, provided
these measures are not "arbitrary or discriminatory." 146 However,
a WTO Panel is responsible for determining whether something
falls within an Article XX exclusion or whether it runs afoul of
Articles 1147 and 111.148 Whether a coercive measure attempting to
harmonize taxation when dealing with nonparticipating free rid-
ers is within exceptions under Article XX 149 is subject to debate,
but at least some preliminary analysis suggests they would be.





treatment"15 clause. 151 Though differentiation is made between
final product national treatment and process-based national treat-
ment, at least some preliminary analysis of WTO cases suggest
that Article III can be avoided.1 52 GATT Article I is the largest
concern generally under the most-favored-nation clause, which
would disallow taxes to be levied on one nation but not the other
given that all signatories are to be afforded most-favored-nation
status under the WTO.15 3 However, Shrimp/Turtle 154 has dem-
onstrated a "fundamental shift in WTO jurisprudence" 15 5 when
considering environmental concerns. In either case, it seems
that border adjustments that serve to protect human animal and
plant life or ensure the conservation of an exhaustible natural
resource are acceptable within the WTO framework.1 56 While
such wording seems to be the flowery language of unenforceable
treaty bodies criticized in the introduction to this Article, they
have been directly confirmed in EC-Asbestos1 57 contingent on
how "vital or important [the] common interests and values" 158
pursued by such a border adjustment could actually be. 159
The scheme as proposed in this Article creates a market
incentive. Lower taxes after abiding by WTO norms mean lower
prices. This encourages the
buy-in from consumers on
whether or not a company is
,est problems "green" and means the con-
tOCOl was the sumers are merely thinking
with their wallets. 160
ofparticipation D. REVENUE
ke the US in GAINING TAX
One of the purposes of
iations and an international agreement to
harmonize domestic carbon
rocess. tax regimes is to create rev-
enue, which can be spent in
two ways. First some of the
money can be turned around for subsidies, which were discussed
previously as a half-measure to be used alongside a responsible
taxation regime. 16 1 Such subsidies would result in more efficient
manufacturing and production as well as greener technology.
Secondly, some of the money should be allocated toward an adap-
tation fund that will serve to help nations with little responsibility
for CO 2 production but face much of the consequences. 162 Some
634 million people live within the low elevation coastal zone, a
region defined as being less than ten meters above sea level. 163
How to defend them from rising sea levels is the first question
among many in considering how to deal with climate change and
how to spend revenue from a carbon tax. Something akin to a
superfund can serve any number of purposes. The easiest target
is protection from flooding caused by rising seas. As pointed out
earlier, delay is a false economy, and the long-term damage caused
by flooding is far more expensive than the short-term costs of
preventing it. 164
Some have posited a revenue neutral tax, meaning that for
every dollar of tax created, taxes will be cut somewhere else. 165
However, when considering the amount of revenue that can be
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generated by a tax on point-source producers may stagger the
imagination. The top five oil companies alone consistently earn
around $ 100 billion annually.1 66
E. NATIONALLY ADMINISTERED OR POOLED FUNDS?
The trickiest question about an international carbon tax is
whether funds from a revenue producing tax should be nationally
administered or pooled. It is a laughable proposition that nations
would willingly send billions of tax dollars out of the country,
but it is not beyond the realm of possibility that countries can be
induced to contribute to at least some sort of international fund
that would help developing nations. Such a hypothetical pooled
fund may result in a two-fold benefit: 1) it serves as a show of good
faith by developed nations for taking responsibility for past action.
2) as developing nations begin to incorporate changes pushed for
by an international carbon tax regime, earmarks can be set aside
to fund the education of key people in the developing world which
is a growing source of pollution and unsustainable development.
Such a method can help bring the developing countries to a higher
level and reduce the short-term costs imposed in international
environmental regimes that unfairly punish the developing coun-
tries going through the same growing pains of the OECD nations
during the 1800s and 1900s.
Of course, any funds
taken out of the country to
be invested abroad can be treaty regin
justified as an incentive for
countries to "cheat" on their overcome te
levies, but cheating can still nations hold
be mitigated with the coer-
cive measures in the previous stance on ci
section dealing with why bor-
der adjustments are accept-
able under Article XX of the
WTO. Facing taxation on exports overseas for failure to comply
means there is no incentive to dodge domestically. On the other
hand, even a tiny fraction of levied taxes could go a long ways
when pooled together in a sort of superfund. Ireland's 2010 yield
from taxation came to $330 million.167 This is a paltry sum as
individually imposed and less than one percent of Ireland's 2012
GDP of $224 billion, 16 but a similar figure applied to the cur-
rent Gross World Product (GWP) would amount to $111 billion
in total taxes collected.169 A mere one percent fund to be targeted
at the most vulnerable areas could go a long way to repairing
some of the harm caused by global warming. 170
This sort of "eco-tax" 17 1 is not placed upon nations by an
international body. Such a move is not only unprecedented but
far too bold within the current paradigm. Eco-taxes are not a
new concept unto themselves, 172 but can be analogized to the
numerous countries which have applied eco-taxes upon citizens
and businesses. However, such a tax should be applied upon
businesses rather than upon the nations, for it is the businesses
responsible for the damage rather than the collectivity of the
nations. Though the nation state is the dominant regime for polit-




pays" principle favored by many economists.1 73 By levying the
tax upon business, the cost is internalized and placed upon the
consumer, which allows the free market to continue thriving
while a race to lower prices functionally conserves the environ-
ment as producing less environmental harm means less taxation
and thus lower internalization of costs. 
174
A treaty regime is necessary to overcome the fear of action
by nations holding a "you first" '175 stance on climate change.
Carbon leakage happens when a nation or a group of nations
attempts to change the dynamic of carbon usage allowing third
parties to take advantage of the glut in cheaper fossil fuels,
production techniques, etc. 176 While countries could protect key
industries from such unfair international competition, to do so
would be nonsensical as these key industries would be the larg-
est source of carbon production leaving behind only half mea-
sures with little gains to show.177 The only way to prevent free
riders is to develop an international scheme that has all the major
actors, whether developed or developing, on the same page of
taxation in a manner that allows the free market to establish new
paradigms without the problems associated with carbon trading,
command and control regulations, and subsidies.
The road map forward will look similar to that which has
already been accomplished
in the International Maritime
is necessary to Organization ("IMO"). The
IMO is a 171-nation strong
r of action by specialized agency of the
United Nations, which devel-
a youfirst' ops comprehensive regula-
Cte change. , tions for shipping as well
as deal with environmental
issues, maritime security
and efficiency in world ship-
ping. 178 Throughout the last 35 years of history, the IMO has
been part of a fund which was to be used as a payout for countries
and individuals hurt by oil spills. 179 The name and function of
the fund has changed with time, but the 1992 Fund Convention
boasts 114 parties and the 1992 Supplementary Fund Protocol
3 1.180 The 1992 fund capped the maximum amount payable to
135 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR),181 which at the time
of this writing has an exchange rate of approximately .72 SDR to
1 USD.18 2 The 2003 Protocol limits compensation to 750 million
SDR and is funded by annual contributions to the fund from any
person who has received total quantities of oil exceeding 150,000
tons, assuming the individual is a member of a state with at least
1,000,000 tons of oil.183 The fund itself is independent of the
United Nations and actually governed by the International Oil
Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds). 184
The IOPC Funds can be considered a success. There first
use was in the 1999, Erika Spill in which a Maltese-registered
tanker broke into two sections 60 nautical miles from the
Brittany coast. 185 Approximately 19,800 tons of the 31,000
tons of heavy oil aboard the ship spilled onto 400 kilometers of
shoreline. 1 6 After a series of legal wrangling to determine how
much would be paid by private insurance and to determine the
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actual damage, some E 116.9 million had been paid by IOPC
2014 to some 131 claimants. 187
5. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION
The treaty envisioned in this Article is unlike anything else
currently in existence; though analogies can be made in several
manners. There are two key features. First, countries agree to a
harmonized carbon taxation regime to be levied at the domestic
level. Second, a small percentage of the national tax is allocated
to a pooled fund which serves to deal with adaptation cost, as
well as to help developing nations grow in a more sustainable
and responsible manner than their developed predecessors.
This broad deference to national governments resembles the
Kyoto Protocol, but differs in two significant ways. First, it does
not give a pass to "developing nations" including China which
now has a rapidly growing per capita share of the world's larg-
est economy. Second, a cabal of industrialized nations can coerce
nonparticipants with an exhaustible resources exception under
GATT Article XX.18 Where Kyoto failed, this treaty can succeed.
The second feature of the treaty is more questionable from
a logistics standpoint. Though nations can coerce participation
in the harmonized taxation scheme, it is unlikely that the type of
coercion allowable under GATT Article XX will also allow puni-
tive measures to hold nations hostage over their unwillingness
to participate in an international fund. However, it is a relatively
small burden on national budgets that can have huge implica-
tions for world-wide adaptation costs.
Though the IOPC has been used as an example of an
international fund, what is envisioned in this treaty is different
for the fact that it would include all nations rather than just oil
importers. It also differs in that, resources will be allocated in an
anticipatory manner for issues related to an ongoing low level
catastrophe of climate change, rather than payment for a single
major event like an oil spill. Such analysis of where the money
can and should be spent is beyond the scope of this Article.
Not all environmental issues can be solves with a taxation
scheme. As with CFCs, some require draconian measures to
completely eliminate a problem. The use of technologies and
resources which create GHGs is so pervasive, there is no way
to remove the problem from society without turning the clock
back some 200 years. However, that does not mean we must
take a fatalistic approach. We can reduce the flow of CO 2 into
the atmosphere, and we can work toward more sustainable
development. If we have reached the point of no return, then
we can seek to reduce the harms caused by climate change.
This is an international problem that requires an international
solution. The methods outlined above are a possible means of
moving forward.
ENDNOTES: DEVELOPING AN INTERNATIONAL CARBON TAx REGIME
I See generally Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. 1, 37
I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
2 See Robert Townsend, Revisiting the Kyoto Protocol: Reducing C02
to Prevent Climate Change Disasters, OLD DOMINION UNIv. MODEL UNITED
NATIONS SOC'Y 1, 2 (2014), https://www.odu.edu/content/dam/odu/offices/
mun/2014/unwc/wc-revisiting-the-kyoto-protocol-reducing-co2-to-prevent-
climate-change-disasters.pdf.
3 See generally Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1.
' See Richard N. Cooper, Toward a Real Global Warming Treaty, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 66, March/April 1998, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/1998-03-01/toward-real-global-warming-treaty.
5 See generally Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/science/indicators/ghg/global-
ghg-emissions.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2016) (referencing "key points"
section).
6 Townsend, supra note 2, at 3.
7 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
U.N. Doc. A/CONE 151/26/Rev. 1 (Vol. I), principle 7 (1992).
s See Charlie E. Coon, Why President Bush Is Right to Abandon the Kyoto
Protocol, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (May 11, 2001), http://www.heritage.org/
researchlreports/2001/05/president-bush-right-to-abandon-kyoto-protocol (not-
ing that four fifths of countries were not required to comply with the goals of
the Kyoto Protocol, in addition to the United States declining the ratification of
the Kyoto Protocol). See generally Overview of Greenhouse Gases, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases/co2.htm
(last visited April 14, 2016) (referencing the graph showing an increase of Car-
bon Dioxide Gas Emissions during the 1990s, the stabilization of these emis-
sions, and their subsequent decrease since 2006 in the United States albeit its
decision to decline ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. Though some equate the drop
in CO2 to the recession, after economic recovery, the United States resumed its
reduction in GHGs from 2010-2012 with 2012 coming to a twenty-year low in
CO 2 Emissions.) [hereinafter Overview of Greenhouse Gases]; Rachel Nuwer, A
Spring 2016
20-Year Low in US. Carbon Emissions, N.Y TIMES: GREEN ENERGY, THE ENV'T.
AND THE BOTTOM LINE (August 17, 2012 6:24 P.M.), http://green.blogs.nytimes.
com/2012/08/17/a-20-year-low-in-u-s-carbon-emissions/?r-0 (indicating that
carbon dioxide has dropped a significant amount during this decade); Overview
of Greenhouse Gases, supra (noting that there was a slight rise in 2013 and
2014 can likely be attributed to a continued strengthening of the US Economy
but one could view this as a return to the relatively stable emissions beginning
in 2004).
9 See C02 Emissions (Metric Tons Per Capita), WORLD BANK, http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC (last visited April, 14, 2016).
10 See id.
" The United States, China, and India report steady population growth rates
with the United States at seven percent, China five percent, and India one and
one-tenth percent. Population Growth (Annual 91), WORLD BANK, http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SEPOP.GROW/countries (last visited Apr. 2, 2016)
(using dataset from 2011-2015).
12 Using estimates from the World Bank from previous footnotes, I have
extrapolated the data to show that China will surpass current per capita CO 2
emissions of the United States within 16 years, India within 18 years. I lack the
algebraic expertise to predict the exact convergence of per capita downward
trends in the US and upward trends in India and China.
13 Canada Under Fire Over Kyoto Protocol Exit, BBC (Dec. 13, 2011), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada- 16165033.
14 See Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, Russia Will Not Cut Emissions Under
Extended Kyoto Climate Pact, REUTERS (Sept. 13, 2012 9:39 A.M.), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/09/13/us-russia-kyoto-idUSBRE88COQZ20120913;
see also C02 Emissions (Metric Tons Per Capita), supra note 9 (indicating that
Russia has maintained its an average of 12.6 metric tons per year of Carbon
Dioxide Emissions).
15 See Townsend, supra note 2, at 3.
16 See TIM HERZOG ET. AL., NAvIGATING THE NUMBERS: GREENHOUSE GAS DATA
AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY, WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 63, available
continued on page 48
ENDNOTES: THE KEY TO ENGAGING WITH THE SDGs: UTILIZING Rio PRINCIPLE 10 TO SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENT TI
U.N. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS
continued from page 2 7
17 Countries currently lacking Right to Information laws include: Cuba,
Venezuela, Paraguay, Libya, Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar, Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Cambodia, Malaysia, and Papua New Guinea. ARTICLE 19 MAP, supra note 4.
1I David Banisar, The Role of the Right to Information in Sustainable Devel-
opment, in Governance for Sustainable Development-Ideas for the Post-2015
Agenda 3. (Friends of Governance for Sustainable Development ed., 2015).
19 Id.
20 Rio DECLARATION, supra note 1.
21 There is no internationally agreed upon definition of FPIC, but a general
description of it is "the right to participate in decision making and to give,
modify, withhold or withdraw consent to an activity affecting the holder of this
right. Consent must be freely given, obtained prior to implementation of such
activities and be founded upon an understanding of the full range of issues
implicated by the activity or decision in question; hence the formulation free,
prior and informed consent." FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, FSC GUIDELINES
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT TO FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT, 11
(FSC International Center GmbH, Version 1, Oct 30, 2012).
22 UNITED NATIONS DEv. PROGRAMME, ACCESS TO JUSTICE-PRACTICE NOTE 7
(2004).
23 This is usually accomplished through legal court systems or other forms of
informal institutions of justice and grievance mechanisms.
24 UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND RULE OF LAW,
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democratiegovernance/
focus areas/focus justice law.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).
25 SDSN INDICATORS AND MONITORING FRAMEWORK REPORT, supra note 14 at 2.
26 See, UNITED NATIONS SUSTAINABLE DEv. GOALS, IAEG-SDGs, http://unstats.
un.org/sdgs/iaeg-sdgs (last visited Mar 2, 2016).
27 SDSN INDICATORS AND MONITORING FRAMEWORK REPORT, supra note 14 at 2.
28 Id. at 7.
ENDNOTES: DEVELOPING AN INTERNATIONAL CARBON TAX REGIME
continued from page 35
at http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pdf/navigatingnumbers.pdf; see also,
Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.
epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html (noting that transportation
(not including the grid to support such transportation), accounts for twenty
percent of U.S. Greenhouse Gas emissions) (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
17 SeeAtmospheric C02, Co2.EARTH, https://www.co2.earth/ (last visited Apr.
14, 2016) (referencing Keeling Curve monthly).
15 See Andrew Freeman, The Last Time C02 Was This High, Humans Didn't
Exist, CLIMATE CENT., http://www.climatecentral.org/news/the-last-time-co2-
was-this-high-humans-didnt-exist-15938 (last updated May 2, 2013).
19 See HERZOG ET. AL., supra note 16, at 3 (showing that in 2004 Atmospheric
Carbon Dioxide measured at about 380 PPM).
20 Freedman, supra note 18.
21 Gavin A. Schmidt & Thomas R. Karl, Annual GlobalAnalysisfor 2014:
2014 was Warmest Year on Record, NASA/NOAA (Jan. 2015), http://www.
ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/briefings/201501.pdf. Measurements go back as far as 1880.
Methodology varies slightly overtime, but by all accounts, the warmest 10 years
since or. growth over the past 30 years on, .ext (indicating that emtn 1 threat on
their own lands, while abusing the environment of devganized measurements
began have occurred since 1998. Id.; Freedman, supra note 18.
22 James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric C02: Where Should Humanity
Aim?, NASA/GODDARD INST. FOR SPACE STUDIES 1 (2008), http://arxiv.org/ftp/
arxiv/papers/0804/0804.1126.pdf.
23 Id. at 12.
24 David P Vincent, Internalizing Externalities: An Economic and Legal
Analysis of an International Carbon Tax Regime, 92 OR. L. REV. 163, 167
(2013), available at https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/
handle/1794/13577/Vincent.pdf?sequence = 1 (citing Brad Plumer, When Do We
Hit the Point of No Return for Climate Change?, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/when-do-we-hit-the-
point-of-no-retumn-for-climate-change/201 11 l/10/gIQA4rri8M blog.html).
25 Stephen Sewalk, Europe Should Dump Cap-And-Trade in Favor of Carbon
Tax with Reinvestment to Global Emissions, 5 WASH. & LEE J. OF ENERGY, CLI-
MATE & ENV'T 355, 361 (2014) (citing Junjie Zhang, ASIA SOCIETY POL'Y INST.,
DELIVERING ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE CASE OF
CHINA 2 (2012) ("China has achieved miraculous economic growth over the past
30 years.... However, growing the gross domestic product (GDP) at any cost has
created a series of social and environmental problems.")..
26 Steven Specht, Dispute Resolution in the Transpacific Partnership:
Pillar or Pitfall, SSRN, Apr. 16, 2016, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfrn?abstract id=2765750.
27 Vincent, supra note 24, at 166-67.
2 The Gross World Product has increased from -$7 trillion in 1960 to
more than $75 trillion today. See J. BRANDFORD DELONG, ESTIMATING WORLD
GDP, ONE MILLION B.C.-PRESENT 8-9, available at http://delong.typepad.com/
print/20061012_LRWGDP.pdf. Adjusting the 1960 number for inflation brings
the 1960 number to $55 trillion. This is a thirty six percent increase compared
with a twenty seven percent increase in the same time period for measuring
atmospheric CO2 from 1958 to the present.
29 Chlorofluorocarbons were the primary culprit in the weakening of the
ozone layer above the South Pole. This will be discussed in more depth in the
section dealing with the problems of alternatives to a carbon tax.
30 See DAVID L. ALLES, ASIAN AIR POLLUTION 23 (David L. Alles ed. 2013),
available at http://fire.biol.wwu.edu/trent/alles/AirPollution.pdf (last updated
April 24, 2013).
31 See id. at 52, 55, 56, 65.
32 See Marzia Sesini, The Garbage Patch in the Oceans: The Problem and
Possible Solutions (Aug. 2011) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Columbia University)
(on file with Columbia University), available at http://www.seas.columbia.edu/
earth/wtert/sofos/sesini thesis.pdf (noting that while the Great Pacific Garbage
Patch in the northern portion of the Pacific Ocean is commonly mentioned in
media, similar concentrations of plastic particles also coalesce in gyres of the
South Pacific, North and South Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean).
13 See Desertification: The Invisible Front Line, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION 10 (2014), http://www.uncecd.intLists/SiteDocu-
mentLibrary/Publications/DesertificationThe 0 %s20invisible frontline.pdf (high-
lighting that some forty percent of conflicts have been disputes over resources
and eighty percent of conflicts have occurred in areas with resource shortages.
It is also a reasonable correlation to link a rise in Islamic fundamentalism grip-
ping the central Africa to the slow creep of the Sahara. Now Nigeria, one of
the largest oil suppliers in the world is gripped in a desperate fight with Boko
Haram.)
34 See generally Multilateral EnvironmentalAgreements 1950 through 2012,
INTERNATIONAL ENVTL. AGREEMENTS (IEA) DATABASE PROJECT, http://iea.uoregon.
edu/page.php?query-summarizebyyear&yearstart = 195 0&yearend-2012&in
elusion MEA (last visited April 15, 2016) (according to the IEA, which tracks
MEAs and Bi-Lateral Environmental Agreements (BEAs), there are currently
1248 MEAs and 1598 BEAs. The number of MEAs in 2007 was 972 meaning
an average of more than 39 agreements per year.).
" These were the words of the Russian delegate who declined to sign the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Nick Fraser, Dignity and Hope:
Too Much toAskFor?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2008, 7:01 P.M.), http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2008/sep/21/humanrights.
36 See DR. SEUSs, THE LoRAx (1971); see also Rhona Lyons, How the Lorax
Can Save the Truffula Trees: The Environmental Remedies Available to the
Individual, 51 Mo. L. REv. 1013 (1986), available at http://scholarship.law.
missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3359&context-mlr (discussing how
an individual affected by pollution of natural resources should have standing to
bring claims against the polluter in Court, similar to the story in The Lorax).
32 While the Supreme Court did not specifically cite to Dr. Seuss, they did
reject arguments by the Sierra Club on behalf of the environment, and greatly
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
reduced remedies for individuals not directly affected by development. See
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).
31 See generally The International Maritime Organization and the Environ-
ment, INT'L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/Documents/
IMO% 20and%20the%20Environment%20201 1.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
It is necessary to note that the United States is a full member of the IMO,
despite often being the outlier in various UN Conventions focusing on second
and third generation rights. The inclusion and exclusion of all the world's domi-
nant economies will become more relevant later in this paper.
39 See Funds Overview, INT'L OIL POLLUTION CoMP. FUNDS, http://www.iopc-
funds.org/about-us/ (last visited March 23, 2016).
40 See New Fund Heralds Better Deal for Oil Pollution Victims, INT'L MAR.
ORG., http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic-id=848&docid=4531
(last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
41 Cf Parties to the International Liability and Compensation Conventions,
INT'L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, http://www.iopcfunds.org/about-us/member-
ship/map/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). It must be pointed out that the United
States has retained observer status in the IOPC. The United States actually lob-
bied for higher standards of liability and in absence of this has enacted similar
domestic legislation under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 which set up the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund. See The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, U.S. COAST
GUARD: NAT'L POLLUTION FUNDS CTR., http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/AboutNPFC/
osltf.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
42 See generally JoHN MCPHEE, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ARCHDRUID (1971) (pro-
viding a series of interviews, where the author discusses development, conser-
vation, and preservation with David Brower who rails against any sort of human
development, even human development that increased biological diversity e.g.
man-made reservoirs).
43 See Zero-Sum Game, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/z/
zero-sumgame.asp#ixzz42R7 lzdNg (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) (defining
zero-sum game as a "situation in game theory in which one person's gain is
equivalent to another's loss, so the net change in wealth or benefit is zero.").
44 See SHI-LING Hsu, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAx 2 (2011).
41 Id. at 2-3. It is a reasonable observation that developing countries would
perhaps have even more negative effects with the use of such cheap oil. Con-
sider that rising CAFE standards in the US have resulted in a burgeoning sell
of used vehicles to the developing world. The fact that vehicles are no longer
able to be used in the US suddenly on the road in another country means little
to no direct change in emissions. See Lucas W Davis & Matthew E. Kahn,
International Trade in Used Vehicles: The Environmental Consequences of
NAFTA, 2 AM. EcoN. J. 58, 71(2010), available at http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/
pdfplus/10.1257/pol.2.4.58 (demonstrating that cars traded from one country
to another result in similar if not worse pollution in the country that the car is
being exported to).
46 See Barry Rabe, The Political Viability of Carbon Taxation, BROOK-
NGS INST. (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/
posts/2012/12/05-carbon-tax-rabe.
47 See generally Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metfalg, Environmental Taxes
and the Double Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for
Nothing?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 221 (1998). The analysis of carbon tax regimes
later in the paper suggest a greater body of anecdotal evidence indicating that,
at least within the realm of carbon taxation, double dividend hypothesis is
firmer than some have posited). But see Lawrence H. Goulder, Environmental
Taxation and the "Double Dividend": A Reader's Guide 18, 31-32 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4896, 1994), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w4896.pdf (noting that the hypothesis has been called
into question for the lack of empirical proof).
48 See JUAN-CARLOS ALTAMIANO-CABRERA ET AL., A GLOBAL CARBON TAx
TO COMPENSATE DAMAGE AND ADAPTATION COSTS 1 (2008), available at http://
gemini-e3.epfl.ch/webdav/site/gemini-e3/shared/A%/ 20global%20carbon / 20
tax%20to%20compensate%20damage%20and% o2Oadaptation%20costs.
49 See William D. Nordhaus, To Tax or Not to Tax: Alt. Approaches to Slowing
Global Warming, 1 Rv. OF ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 26, 40 (2007), available at
http://www.econ.yale.edu/-nordhaus/homepage/nordhaus-carbontax-reep.pdf.
1o See Amy J. Holzinger, Eco-Taxes in the European Union: The Need for a
Uniform Structure, 21 WIs. INT'L L.J. 185, 204 (2003).
51 See Environmental Taxes, EUROPEAN ENV'T AGENCY, http://www.eea.europa.
eu/publications/92-9167-205-X/page016.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) (out-
lining how the vast majority of environmental taxes in Europe have come from
energy and transportation).
52 See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 137 (2013)
(using the example of the United States in the 1970s when it wanted to reduce
sulfur dioxide).
53 Id.
54 See Alternatives to CFCs, EASYCHEM.COM.AU, http://www.easychem.com.
au/monitoring-and-managementthe-atmosphere/alternatives-to-cfcs (last
visited Apr. 15, 2016). This is of course not taking into account that these
chemicals bring about their own issues including adding to the mix of GHGs
responsible for global warming. This merely shows the limited successful
role of Command-and-Control Regulation. CFC Substitutes: Good for the
Ozone Layer, Bad for Climate?, Sci. DAILY, http://www.sciencedaily.com/
releases/2012/02/120224110737.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
11 Hsu, supra note 44, at 19.
56 David Gee, Economic Tax Reform in Europe: Opportunities and Obstacles,
in TIMOTHY O'RIORDAN, ECOTAXATION 94 (1997).
57 Id.
11 Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards require that the aver-
age fuel efficiency of a given manufacturer meet a certain standard. See Fuel
Economy Regulations and Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HTTP://WWW3.
EPA.GOV/FUELECONOMY/REGULATIONS.HTM (last visited April 15, 2016).
59 See VIRGINIA McCONNELL, THE NEW CAFE STANDARDS: ARE THEY ENOUGH
ON THEIR OWN? 5 (2013), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-
DP-13-14.pdf.
60 A car operating at 20 miles per gallon will travel 200 miles with 10 miles
of gas. A second car operating at 30 miles per gallon can accomplish the same
distance in 6.7 gallons of gas. However, if savings on fuel efficiency is redi-
rected into increasing driving by 50 percent, the driver who goes 300 miles with
the second car still uses 10 gallons of gas.
61 See Stephen Sewalk, Europe Should Dump Cap-and-Trade in Favor of
Carbon Tax with Reinvestment to Global Emissions, 5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY,
CLIMATE & ENv'T, 355, 367 (2014).
62 Id.
63 Hsu, supra note 44 at 20.
64 Hsu, supra note 44, at 21.
65 Sewalk, supra note 61, at 371.
66 See National Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ENV'T CAN., https://www.ec.gc.
ca/indicateurs-indicators/default.asp?lang--en&n=FBF8455E-1 (last updated
April 11, 2014) (demonstrating Canada's experience with greenhouse gas emis-
sions) [hereinafter "Greenhouse Gas Emissions"].
67 See Sewalk, supra note 61, at 369.
68 See id. at 366 (providing a brief description of the program's inception).
The EU ETS included all members of the EU at inception as well as Norway,
Iceland, Croatia, and Liechtenstein. See EU-ETS 2005-2012, EUROPEAN
COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre20l3/indexen.htm (last
visited April 15, 2016). Croatia's accession to the EU in 2013 made it the
28th nation of the EU. See Croatia Joins the EU, EUROPEAN UNION NEWSROOM,
HTTP://EUROPA.EU/NEWSROOM/fUGHLIGHTS/SPECIAL-COVERAGE/CROATIA-JOINS-EU/
INDEXEN.HTM (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
69 See Tim Laing et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of the EU Emissions
Trading System 1 (Ctr. for Climate Change Econ. and Policy Working
Paper No. 126, 2013), http://www.lse.ac.uk/Granthamlnstitute/wp-content/
uploads/2014/02/WP106-effectiveness-eu-emissions-trading-system.pdf (last
visited April 10, 2016).
70 See ETS, RIP?, ECONOMIST, (Apr. 20, 2013), http://www.economist.com/
news/finance-and-economics/21576388-failure-reform-europes-carbon-market-
will-reverberate-round-world-ets.
1 Sewalk, supra note 61, at 369 (citing Julien Chevallier et al., Options
Introduction and Volatility in the EUETS, 33 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 855,
873 (2011) (explaining the uncertain nature of predicting the behavior of carbon
markets)).
72 Sewalk, supra note 61, at 375 (citing Sid Maher, Europe's $287bn
Carbon "Waste:" UBS Report, THE AUSTRALIAN (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.
theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/europes-287bn-carbonwaste-ubs-report/
story-fn59niix-1226203068972# ("UBS says the European Union's emissions
trading scheme has cost the continent's consumers $287 billion for "almost
zero impact" on cutting carbon emissions... ?")). At the same time the trading
scheme costs consumers some E2 1Obn which could have been allocated to
replace the dirtiest power plants for a reduction of emissions by forty-three
percent. See Maher, supra.
73 This is a reference to the problems of centrally planned economies in
the Soviet Union which lacked the flexibility to adjust their targets swiftly.
Two examples include a surplus of left shoes or a surplus of 1.5 million
Spring 2016
sewing machines when bureaucrats working to reduce a shortage of sewing
machines forgot to turn the program off. See Richard C. Longworth, THE CALL-
LEADER, NOV. 9, 1967, at 10, available at http://call-leader.newspapers.com/
newspage/87896896/.
74 See Jeff Brady, After Solyndra Loss, US. Energy Loan Program Turning a
Profit, NPR, http://www.npr.org/2014/11/13/363572151/after-solyndra-loss-u-s-
energy-loan-program-turning-a-profit (last updated Nov. 20, 2014).
15 Am. Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
145 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 16516 (2009)), available athttp:/
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-l 1 Ipubl5/pdf/PLAW-11 lpubl5.pdf.
76 See Henry C. Jackson, Program that Funded Solyndra Failure Producing
Success Stories, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2014), available at http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/politics/program-that-ftmded-solyndra-failure-producing-success-
stories/2014/12/30/3e896b46-9074-1 e4-a900-9960214d4cd7_story.html.
77 Id. ("[The stimulus] has been a tremendous success; I mentioned $30
billion in loans with a 2 percent default rate-that is pretty enviable in my
portfolio.").
78 RACHEL GELMAN & STEVE HoCKETT, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY OFFICE OF
ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, 2008 RENEWABLE ENERGY DATA BOOK
3 (Michelle Kubik ed., 2009), http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/geothermal/pdfs/
data book.pdf. (2008 is emphasized for the fact that the American Recovery
and Investment Act at issue in this discussion was in 2009).
79 See Aaron Tucker, Government Intervention in Clean Energy Technology
During the Recession, 42 TEx. ENVTL. L.J. 347, 349 (2012) (citing GELMAN &
HoCKETT, supra note 78, at 3).
so Id.
81 The total amount of the American Recovery and Investment Act was $787
billion. Of this $75 billion was for green investments. However, much of the
green investments were for improving existing infrastructure (for example
insulation of old buildings) Environment America which is a federation of state-
based advocacy groups estimated the total amount of stimulus for clean energy
projects came to $32.8 billion. See How do "Green Projects " Create Jobs?,
SCIENTIFIC AM. (July 16, 2009), http://www.scientificamerican.comarticle/
how-do-green-projects-create-jobs/.
82 The Iron Triangle is composed of interest groups, Congress, and bureau-
cracy, which can be united in preserving a specific spending paradigm. See E
Gregory Hayden, Policymaking Network of the Iron-Triangle Subgovernment
for Licensing Hazardous Waste Facilities, 36 J. OF ECON. ISSUES 477, 479 (2002),
available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1 007&c
ontextcbafacpub.
83 The defense industry still puts out a large quantity of Cold War era tech-
nology such as Abrams Tanks which serve little purpose in the last 20 years
of overseas contingency operations. Military planners would prefer to "use
[defense spending] in a different way." Phillip Swarts, Lawmakers Force Pen-
tagon to Buy Tanks, Keep Ships and Planes it Doesn 't Need, WASH. GUARDIAN
(May 9, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/9/lawmakers-
force-pentagon-to-buy-tanks-keep-ships-a/?page=all. However the paradox of
the iron triangle preventing meaningful reform is outlined by representatives
from Ohio where Abrams tanks are manufactured. Congressman Jim Jordan,
OH-4, when pushed on his support of shaving $42 billion from the defense
budget but blocking a cessation of producing Abrams tanks in his district. "My
job is to represent the 4th Congressional District [of Ohio]." Id. His colleague
in Ohio's 10h Congressional District was equally honest. "An additional $120
million for Abram's tank upgrades" "keeps the production lines open in Lima,
Ohio, and ensures that our skilled, technical workers are protected." See Richard
Sisk, Congress Again Buys Abrams Tanks the Army Doesn't Want, MILITARY
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/12/18/
congress-again-buys-abrams-tanks-the-army-doesnt-want.html.
84 An example of this incredible gap in technology is fears that Chinese
Stealth Technology might catch up with that of the F-35. What must be pointed
out is that the most advanced jet in the Chinese arsenal is currently on par
with the F-15 and the F-18, jets whose most recent models were rolled out in
1989 and 1995 respectively. See Dave Majumdar, US. Pilots Say New Chinese
Stealth Fighter Could Become Equal ofF-22, F-35, U.S. NAvy INST. (Nov. 6,
2014), http://news.usni.org/2014/11/05/u-s-pilots-say-new-chinese-stealth-
fighter-become-equal-f-22-f-35. See also F-15E STRIKE EAGLE FACT SHEET, U.S.
AIR FORCE (Apr. 15, 2005), http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/
tabid/224/Article/104499/f-15e-strike-eagle.aspx (providing a background on
the F-15E Strike Eagle Aircraft); F/A-18 FACT FILE, U.S. NAVY (May 26, 2009),
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact display.asp?cid=1 100&tid= 1200&ct- 1
(providing a background on the F/A-18 Aircraft).
85 See Bobby Magill, Okla. Utilities Hit Homes Using Solar With Extra
Fee, CLIMATE CENT. (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/
oklahoma-solar-surcharge-bill-becomes-law-17335.
86 See Putting a Price on Carbon with a Tax, WORLD BANK, http://www.world-
bank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/SDN/background-note-carbon-tax.
pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
17 See generally Where Carbon is Taxed, CARBON TAx CTR., http://www.
carbontax.org/services/where-carbon-is-taxed/ (last modified Jan. 15, 2015).
88 Id.
89 Id.
9o David G. Duff, Carbon Taxation in British Columbia, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L.
87, 90 (2008); Nicholas Rivers & Brandon Schaufele, Carbon Tax Salience and
Gasoline Demand 1 (Dep't of Econ.: Faculty of Social Sciences U. of Ottawa,
Working Paper No. 121 1E, 2012), available at http://socialsciences.uottawa.ca/
sites/default/files/public/eco/eng/documents/121 le.pdf.
91 Duff, supra note 90, at 90. The Albertan system was done alongside a
carbon trading regime. Alberta s Climate Change Program, IETA, http://www.
ieta.org/Resources/Resources/101 s/ab-climate-change-program-april2015.pdf
(last updated Apr. 2015).
92 Duff, supra note 90, at 91.
9 Id. at 97 (noting that at the time of introduction, gasoline was taxed at 2.41
cents per liter, diesel at 2.76 cents per liter propane at 1.53 cents per liter of
propane, aviation fuel at 2.45 cents per liter. Other similar numbers were intro-
duced for natural gas, low-heat-value coal, high-heat-value coal, coke, peat, and
tires.); see also Greenery in Canada: We Have a Winner, ECONOMIST (July 21,
2011), http://www.economist.com/node/18989175 (discussing that the rate of
$10 per ton was an introductory rate intended to increase over time by $5 annu-
ally.); Stewart Elgie, British Columbia s Carbon Tax Shift: An Environmental
and Economic Success, WORLD BANK (Sept. 10, 2014), http://blogs.worldbank.
org/climatechange/british-columbia-s-carbon-tax-shift-environnental-and-
economic-success (reporting that as of September 2014, the amount had risen to
$30 per ton).
94 See Duff, supra note 90, at 88.
95 See id.
96 See id.
97 JEFFREY SIMPSON ET AL., HOT AIR: MEETING CANADA'S CLIMATE CHANGE
CHALLENGE 87 (2011) (explaining that cynicism on the subject of well-intended
but functionally failed policies is alive and well as these authors point out that
change is needed, but that it will take decades to see any lasting change from
sensible policies).
98 See Duff, supra note 90, at 89.
99 Greenery in Canada: We Have a Winner, supra note 93.
188 See id. (noting the national unemployment rate for Canada is 6.7 percent
while those in British Columbia are 5.5 percent); Labour force characteristics,
seasonally adjusted, by province (monthly) (Saskatchewan, Alberta, British
Columbia), STATISTICS CAN., available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-
tableaux/sum-som/10 /cstOl lfss01 c-eng.htm (last visited April 24, 2016).
181 See Elgie, supra note 93 (noting that Canada withdrew from the Kyoto
Protocol in 2012); see also Kyoto Protocol, supra note 1, at ch. XXVII.
1"2 See Canada GDP Growth Rate 1961-2015, TRADING ECON., http://www.
tradingeconomics.com/canada/gdp-growth (highlighting the Canadian economy
began to retract in late 2007 and plummeted to a nearly two percent decline
in 2009. The economy has since regained positive growth that remains below
one percent annually) (last visited Apr. 24, 2016) [hereinafter "Canada GDP
Growth Rate"].
103 See Elgie, supra note 93.
104 See Yoram Bauman, The Canadians Are Coming!, SIGHT-
LINE DAILY (May 21, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://daily.sightline.
org/2014/05/21/the-canadians-are-coming/; Andy Skuce, The Effect
of Cross-Border Shopping on BC Fuel Consumption Estimates,
CRITICAL ANGLE (Aug. 18, 2013), http://critical-angle.net/2013/08/18/
the-effect-of-cross-border-shopping-on-bc-fuel-consumption-estimates/.
185 See Nicholas Rivers, The Case for a Carbon Tax in Canada, CANADA 2020
(Nov. 11, 2014), http://canada202O.ca/canada-carbon-tax/ (explaining among
Canadian provinces, Alberta is the second highest producer of per capita GHG
emissions. This is likely due to its role in developing the Athabasca Oil Sands.
However, alongside a carbon tax, Alberta has also instituted a carbon trading
program which has resulted in reductions of 51 million tons of GHG according
to the Albertan government. This seems to be a slow in growth of emissions
rather than an aggregate reduction as the Canadian government shows GHG
production to rise from an estimated 231 tons to 249 tons from 2005-2012.
Compared with the growth from 169 in 1990, the rate of growth has shifted
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
from 2.7% annually to 1.1%. Placed alongside the booming development of oil
resources, the growth of emissions has been more than halved, something akin
to success by some estimates.); cf Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 66
(comparing Quebec, which has the least amount of per capita GHG production
to begin with but has shown an overall drop in per capita GHG production. The
fact that so much information exists for the overwhelming success of British
Columbia while so little information exists for the lesser successes in Alberta
and Quebec is akin to a drunk looking for his keys under a street lamp, because
"that is where the light is.").
06 Where Carbon is Taxed, supra note 87.
107 See Peter Hannam, Fall in Greenhose Gas Emissions Biggest in 24 Years,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (June 13, 2014), http://www.smh.com.au/environ-
ment/climate-change/fall-in-greenhouse-gas-emissions-biggest-in-24-years-
20140613 -zs7be.html (last visited April 10, 2016).
its See Marianna O'Gorman & Frank Jotzo, Impact of the carbon price on
Australia s electricity demand, supply and emissions, CTR. FOR CLIMATE EcON.
& POL'Y (July, 17, 2014), https:/ccep.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/
publication/ccep-crawford anu edu au/2014-07/ccepl4 1.pdf.
159 See Oliver Milman, Carbon tax demise leading to large
rise in emissions, says academic, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 4,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/04/
carbon-tax-demise-leading-to-large-rise-in-emissions-says-academic.
110 Hannam, supra note 107.
111 See Canada GDP Growth Rate, supra note 102; Australia GDP Growth
Rate 1959-2016, TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/
australia/gdp-growth (last visited April 15, 2015). (explaining that Australia
suffered less in the global decline of 2007-2008 and has had two minor reces-
sions in 2008 and 2010. GDP growth rate has typically stayed within 0.5 and
1.5% annually over the last decade. Any attempt to make a correlation with
GDP growth rate and the sudden rise in emissions fails, as the change in GDP
following the change in government was actually a decline from 1.l1% to 0.5%.
The growth rate remains at 0.5% per quarter, down from the 0.7% per quarter
average in the eight quarters during which the carbon tax was in place.).
112 Jenny Fung, Informing Green Tax Policy Through the Laffer Curve, 9
WASH. U. UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH DIGEST 4 (2014), available at http://open-
scholarship.wustl.edu/vol9_iss2/3; see also Where Carbon is Taxed, supra note
87.
113 See Fung, supra note 112, at 4.
114 See Where Carbon Is Taxed, supra note 87.
113 See Fung, supra note 112, at 8.
116 Id. at 10.
117 See IRELAND'S PROVISIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN 2013: KEY HIGH-
LIGHTS, IRELAND EPA 1 (2014), available at http://www.epa.ie/pubs/reports/air/
airemissions/GHGprov.pdf..
118 Richard L. Ottinger, Energy and Environmental Challenges for Developed
and Developing Countries; Keynote Address Presented at the United Nations
Meeting on Energy and Environment in the Development Process, 9 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 55, 102-03 (1991).
119 See id.
120 See Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can
National Governments Address A Global Problem?, U. CHI. LEGAL E 293
(1997).
121 See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument
Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 786 (1999) (citing Stuart Eizenstat,
Stick with Kyoto: A Sound Start on Global Warming, FOREIGN AFF. at 119-120
(May/June 1998), (rebutting the advocacy of an international greenhouse gas
tax)).
122 See Sangmin Shim, Korea's Leading Role in Joining the Kyoto Protocol
with the Flexibility Mechanisms As "Side-Payments ", 15 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REv. 203, 231 (2003).
123 See Paul G. Harris, Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of
Regime Failure, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 195, 213 (2007) (noting that it was
"never likely that an international carbon tax would be implemented.").
124 See Hsu, supra note 44, at 20, See generally Chris Hastings, Implementing
a Carbon Tax in Florida under the Clean Power Plan: Policy Considerations,
43 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1035, 1054 (2016).
125 See Cooper, supra note 4, at 67-68 (emphasis added).
126 See WILLIAM FORSTER LLOYD, Two LECTURES ON THE CHECKS TO POPULATION
17 (Oxford Univ. Press 1833) (stating that "the influence of different institutions
and conditions of society, according as they are favourable or unfavourable to
the preventive check, will form an interesting subject of inquiry.").
127 See John D. McKinnon & Scott Thurm, US. Firms Move Abroad to Cut
Taxes, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2012, 9:38 PM), available at http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10000872396390444230504577615232602107536 (explaining a
company's domicile is often determined by the most favorable taxation rates).
128 See UNEP Report: Developing Countries 'Adaptation Costs Likely to Far
Surpass Previous Estimates, UNITED NATIONS ENv'T. PROGRAMME (Dec. 5, 2014),
http://www.un.org/climatechange/blog/2014/12/unep-report-developing-coun-
tries-adaptation-costs-likely-far-surpass-previous-estimates/ (noting adaptation
costs are those associated with the "intensifying impacts of climate change such
as drought, floods and rising sea levels.") [hereinafter "UNEP"].
129 See Working Group III: Mitigation, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/index.php?idp=251 (last vis-
ited April 10, 2016).
"I See Michael Hoel, Harmonization of Carbon Taxes in International Cli-
mate Agreements, 3 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 221, 221 (1993).
131 See Cooper, supra note 4, at 74.
132 See Special Report: The Global 2000, FORBES (April 2, 2008, 6:00 PM),
available at http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/18/biz_2000globalO8_The-
Global-2000_Prof.html.
133 See generally Stephen Spratt, Preface to A Sterling Solution, STAMP
OUT POVERTY 2 (Sept. 2006), http://www.stampoutpoverty.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/10 /A-Sterling-Solution.pdf.
134 See Holzinger, supra note 50, at 194 (2003).
135 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., ENVTL. TAXES AND GREEN TAX
REFORM 16-18 (1997).
136 See Lloyd, supra note 126.
137 See ALTAMIRANO-CABRERA ET AL., supra note 48 at 12.
138 See generally World Economic Outlook Database, INT'L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf£org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/weodata/index.aspx (citing
"By Countries (country-level data" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).
139 See Charles D. Patterson, III, Environmental Taxes and Subsidies: What
is the Appropriate Fiscal Policy for Dealing With Modern Environmental
Problems?, 24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 121, 124-25, 127 (2000)
(noting the different kinds of management systems at a corporation's disposal).
140 But see Coon, supra note 8.
141 See Shim, supra note 122, at 229-31 (2003) (addressing some potential
solutions to the free-rider problem).
142 Report by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, 4, L/3464 (Nov.
20, 1970), at 2, available at http://worldtradelaw.net/document.php?id-reports/
gattpanels/bordertax.pdf (explaining a Border Adjustment as "[A]ny fiscal
measures which put into effect, in whole or in part, the destination principle
(i.e. which enable exported products to be relieved of some or all of the tax
charged in the exporting country in respect of similar domestic products sold
to consumers on the home market and which enable imported products sold to
consumers to be charged with some or all of the tax charged in the importing
country in respect of similar domestic products.")).
143 See DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE
STRUGGLE TO SLow GLOBAL WARMING 5, 7 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001) (noting
that developing nations are extremely cautious in entering into these taxes as it
may place an economic burden on them in order to keep up with the develop-
ments of greenhouse gas controls).
144 See Vincent, supra note 24, at 167.
145 See id. at 176-79.
146 Id. at 180.
147 See GATT 1994:General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art. I,
THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187,33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter
GATT 1994).
148 See id. at art. III.
149 See id. at art. XX.
1 See id. at art. III.
151 Vincent, supra note 24, at 181.
152 See id. at 180-83.
153 See id. at 183-84.
154 See generally Gregary Shaffer, Note, United States Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 507, 508 (1999) (pro-
viding a background on Shrimp/Turtle); Victor, supra note 143, at 88 (explain-
ing that Shrimp Turtle opened the door to enforce legitimate environmental
goals in international trade).
Spring 2016
155 Vincent, supra note 24, at 180 (quoting Timothy E. Deal, WTO Rules and
Procedures and Their Implications for the Kyoto Protocol 8, U.S. CouNcIL FOR
INT'L Bus. (2008), http://www.uscib.org/docs/wto-and kyoto-2008.pdf).
156 See id. at 185 (citing GATT art. XX).
157 See generally Laura Yavitz, The World Trade Organization Appellate Body
Report, European Communities MeasuringAffecting Asbestos andAsbestos
Containing Products, Mar. 12, 2001 WT/DS135/AB/R, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 43, 66 (2002) (stating that "Article XX's exceptions can be accepted if
they can explain trade measures in terms of protecting people, animals, plants
or exhaustible natural resources within their own jurisdictional limits and with-
out requiring others to change any policies or production methods.").
158 TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT AT THE WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG. 21, 52 (2004),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/envir-e/envir-wto2004_e.pdf.
159 See Vincent, supra note 24, at 187.
160 See Patterson, supra note 139, at 127. See generally ALEXANDRE KISS &
DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVTL. LAW 215 (Transnational Publishers, Inc.
2d ed. 2007).
161 See Kate Gordon, Why Renewable Energy Still Needs Subsidies, WALL
ST. J. (Sep. 14, 2015, 8:20 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2015/09/14/
why-renewable-energy-still-needs-subsidies/.
162 See UNEP, supra note 128.
163 See New Research Analyzes Countries at Greatest Risk from Climate
Change Impacts, EARTH INST. AT COLUMBIA U. (March 29, 2007), http://www.
earth.columbia.edu/news/2007/storyO3-29-07.php. See generally PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL POPULATION LIVINo IN COASTAL AREAS, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.
un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/methodology-sheets/oceans seas coasts/
pop-coastal areas.pdf (detailing the global population living in coastal areas)
(last visited April 26, 2015).
164 See Jochen Hinkel et al., Coastal Flood Damage andAdaptation Costs
Under 21st Century Sea-Level Rise, 111 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACAD.
OP SCI. OF THE U.S. 3292, 3293 (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/
assets/2014/02/04/document ew.01 .pdf ("Without adaptation, 0.2-4.6% of
global population is expected to be flooded annually in 2100 under 25-123
cm of global mean sea-level rise, with expected annual losses of 0.3-9.3% of
global gross domestic product. Damages of this magnitude are very unlikely to
be tolerated by society and adaptation will be widespread. The global costs of
protecting the coast with dikes are significant with annual investment and main-
tenance costs of US $12-71 billion in 2100, but much smaller than the global
cost of avoided damages even without accounting for indirect costs of damage
to regional production supply.").
265 See Cooper, supra note 4, at 74.
166 See 2015 Ranking of the Global Top 10 Oil and Gas Companies Based on
Net Income (in Billion US. Dollars), STATISTICS PORTAL (2015), http://www.
statista.com/statistics/27271 1/top-global-oil-and-gas-companies-based-on-net-
income/ (indicating that it is unclear at the time of this writing precisely how to
deal with subsidies of gas and oil companies by Western governments or how
to properly levy a tax on the state-owned enterprise (SOEs) that exist in Russia
and China); see also Daniel J. Weiss & Miranda Peterson, With Only $93 Bil-
lion in Profits, the Big Five Oil Companies Demand to Keep Tax Breaks, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
greennews/2014/02/10/83879/with-only-93 -billion-in-profits-the-big-five-oil-
companies-demand-to-keep-tax-breaks/.
167 See Eric Gargan, Reflections on the Implementation of the Carbon
Tax in Ireland, ENERGY AND ENVTL. TAXATION, FISCAL POL'Y Div. (May 16,
2012), http://www.nesc.ie/assets/files/downloads/project-climate%/o20change/
ucd workshop/ericgargan.pdf.
166 See Ireland GDP 1960-2016, TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.tradingeco-
nomics.com!ireland/gdp (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).
169 See Gross Domestic Products of Nations, WORLD BANK, http://databank.
worldbank.org/data/download/GDPpdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).
170 See Guyana, CLIMATE HOT MAP, http://www.climatehotmap.org/global-
warming-locations/guyana.html (providing Guyana as an example of a vulner-
able nation) (last visited Apr. 26, 2016); Guyana GDP 1960-2016, TRADING
ECON., http://www.tradingeconomics.com/guyana/gdp (highlighting a fund
would help protect the economies of developing nations which in turn means
increased purchasing power to participate in international markets. For example,
80 percent of the Guyanese population lives in a low-lying coastal region along
with most of the national industry and agriculture. The cost of dealing with
a predicted global sea level rise of two meters comes to a little more than $1
billion which is far less than the economic damage caused by flooding or the
long term cost of regional instability caused by a weakened Guyanese economy.
However, the $1 billion price tag is roughly 33 percent of Guyanese GDP as of
2014, an insurmountable cost for mere domestic measures) (last visited Apr. 26,
2016).
171 See Holzinger, supra note 50, at 186.
172 See JEAN-PHILIPPE BARDE, ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION: EXPERIENCE IN OECD
COUNTRIES 230 (1997).
173 See Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 160, at 215.
174 See Holzinger, supra note 50, at 190.
17' Andrew C. Revkin, A Closer Look at China s 'You First'Stance in Climate
Treaty Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2013, 2:43 PM), http://dotearth.blogs.
nytimes.com/2013/11/22/a-closer-look-at-chinas-you-first-stance-in-climate-
treaty-talks/?_r=O.
176 See Vincent, supra note 24, at 165-66.
177 See id. at 175.
178 See Member States, IGOs, and NGOs, INT'L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.
org/en/About/Membership/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Apr 26, 2016).
179 See International Convention on the Establishment of an International
Fundfor Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, INT'L MAR. ORG., http://
www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-
Convention-on-the-Establishment-of-an-International-Fund-for-Compensation-
for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-%28FUND%29.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2016)
[hereinafter "FUND"].
180 See Parties to the International Liability and Compensation Conventions,
INT'L OIL POLLUTION CLEANUP, http://www.iopcfunds.org/about-us/membership/
map/# (explaining notable absences include the oil producing countries of the
United States, Libya, and Iraq. As the fund is for those receiving oil rather than
exporting it, this is reasonable.) (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).
1"1 See FUND, supra note 180.
182 See SDR Valuation, INT'L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imforg/external/
np/finldata/rms sdrv.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).
183 See FUND, supra note 180.
184 See id.; Home, INT'L OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUND, http://www.iopc-
funds.org/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).
185 See Erika, INT'L OIL POLLUTION CLEANUP FUND, http://www.iopcfunds.org/
incidents/incident-map/#l 11-1999-235-December (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).
186 See id.
187 See id.
188 Vincent, supra note 24, at 180, 184.
ENDNOTES: THE LAW OF THE SEAS: A BARRIER TO IMPLEMENTATION OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 14
continued from page 3 7
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/05/27/law-of-the-sea-symposium-whaling-wars-non-
state-actors-and-international-responsibility/"
28 See Sea Shepherd Seeks Dutch Prosecution of Japanese Whalers, ENV'T
NEWS SERV. (Mar. 24, 2013) http://ens-newswire.com/2013/03/21/sea-shepherd-
seeks-dutch-prosecution-of-japanese-whalers/ (detailing SSCS's claim that
IRS's "commercial whaling in the waters south of 60 degrees violated the
Antarctic Treaty that prohibits commercial activity in the waters around the
continent of Antarctica").
29 See Flags of Inconvenience, supra note 25 (explaining that cargo owners
and shipping companies are excluded from the authority of UNCLOS).
o See Goal 14, supra note 4.
1 See In deep water, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.economist.
com/news/international/21596990-humans-are-damaging-high-seas-now-
oceans-are-doing-harm-back-deep-water ("Two-thirds of fish stocks on the high
seas are over-exploited-twice as much as in parts of oceans under national
jurisdiction").
32 See Goal 14, supra note 4.
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
